In June 2023, supreme leader Ali Khamenei declared that there was “nothing wrong” with reaching an agreement with Western countries concerning the nuclear programme. These words, five years after Trump’s unilateral withdrawal, seemed to lay the groundwork for a some sort of an agreement on the Iranian nuclear dossier, despite the sense of distrust that has characterised United States-Iranian relations. After years of stalled negotiations, last spring Tehran and Washington had embarked on a phase of détente that was beginning to bear fruit. With the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza on October 7, however, this positive trend was reversed. Against this backdrop, the prospect of reinitiating the negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) appears increasingly unlikely, paving the way for further Iran’s uranium enrichment. In fact, on one hand, the ongoing regional instability has reignited traditional mutual distrust, thwarting any prospect of a de-escalation between Washington and Tehran. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic could now seek to counterbalance its weakening regional deterrence by acquiring the status of nuclear-weapon state.
Small steps forward before October 7
Despite a prevailing atmosphere of mutual distrust, relations between Washington and Tehran have witnessed fluctuations over the past years. The most recent window of opportunity for regional de-escalation between the two parties was opened last May. After Iran’s uranium enrichment peaked at 84% in February last year, the US decided to sit down again at informal negotiating tables with Tehran to prevent the Islamic Republic from exceeding the 90% threshold. In a meeting, facilitated by Oman, between US Middle East Coordinator, Brett McGurk, and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, it was agreed to limit the Islamic Republic’s enrichment to 60%. While this level is significantly higher than the 3.67% fixed by the 2015 JCPOA, it remains below the 90% threshold required for creating a nuclear weapon. Iran also pledged to subject itself to regular monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, Washington would allow the release of Iranian funds frozen abroad.
Another step forward in this de-escalation process, always mediated by regional actors, came with the mid-September agreement, which involved the release of five US citizens detained in Iran in exchange for the release of USD6 billion frozen in Korean banks. The USD6 billion, owed for oil imports from Korea, had been released in September at the behest of the US and made available for the purchase of essential goods by Tehran.
The agreement in September was also the result of a collaborative effort between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In early May, Iran had already granted permission for the IAEA to reinstall cameras in its nuclear power plants and had begun decreasing the quantity of enriched uranium, while limiting the enrichment process to 60%. The IAEA Board Report published in September confirmed these efforts, revealing that Tehran had reduced its enriched uranium stockpile from 4744.5kg in May 2023 to 3795.5kg. The report also disclosed that the average monthly enrichment of 60% uranium in the last quarter was 2.3kg, less than half of the previous period’s average. Notably, this marked the first time since 2021 that Iran had decelerated high-level uranium enrichment.
These positive developments were expected to be followed by a new round of negotiations towards de-escalation on October 18, once again mediated by Oman. However, the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza has interrupted this process and seems to have convinced Tehran and Washington that a path of negotiation is no longer viable.
Post-Conflict Developments: Unfolding Scenarios and Implications
Soon after October 7, the scheduled talks in Oman were cancelled and the USD6 billion unblocked by Washington were frozen. Furthermore, according to the IAEA report in November, Iran once again increased uranium enrichment – reaching a stockpile of 4486.8 kg (a surge of 691.3kg compared to the level in September) – and the average monthly enrichment of 60% uranium has accelerated. For Iran, uranium enrichment could also compensate for the erosion of its regional deterrence.
The Institute for Science and International Security suggests that Iran could now produce enough weapons-grade uranium for six nuclear weapons in a month by utilizing combined uranium currently enriched to 20% and 60%. Continuing at the same pace, it could have the capacity to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for eight nuclear weapons in two months, ten in three months, eleven in four months, and twelve in five months. Nonetheless, to ascend to the status of a nuclear-weapon state, the Islamic Republic would need to undertake further measures, such as converting uranium from gas to metal, tritium breeding, and conducting carrier tests. These additional processes would take at least one or two years to complete. Once the 90% threshold is exceeded, the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear-weapon state would only be a matter of time.
In this context, IAEA President Rafael Grossi has expressed concern about Iran’s enrichment activities, once again criticising the lack of transparency in its atomic programme, as well as the construction of four more nuclear power plants in the southern coastal province of Hormozgan, scheduled for completion within nine years.
Moreover, adding fuel to the fire is the persistent advancement of the missile programme. The launch of the Iranian satellite Soraya on January 20, 2024, via the Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) Ghaem-100, sent into a low earth orbit of 750 km, was also a source of blame for the Islamic Republic. Criticism came mainly from the E3 countries (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), which pointed out that the SLV utilizes technology crucial for the advancement of a long-range ballistic missile system.
According to many experts, diplomacy remains the best tool to avoid Iran’s uranium enrichment to the 90% threshold. However, so far diplomacy has not effectively worked. Iran’s deep distrust of the different approaches taken so far by US administrations has contributed to undermining the diplomatic process. If in the past Iran has favoured the tactic of threatening the West with the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons rather than actually acquiring them, a shift may be underway following the Gaza war. The conflict could prompt Tehran to forsake its policy of “strategic patience” – initially adopted to counter the US “maximum pressure” approach during the Trump era – and opt instead for further advancement of its nuclear programme. This scenario is not unlikely today if the Iranian leadership believes that the most viable form of defence is no longer “forward defence”, but to become a nuclear-weapon state.
The views expressed are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the positions of ISPI
L'articolo Iran’s Nuclear Tango: Negotiation Setbacks proviene da ISPI.