The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we shed light on the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as the ninth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
On July 6, former Health Minister and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the runoff in Iran’s presidential election, securing more than 54% of the votes. The low turnout of less than 50% underscores the deep legitimacy crisis the Islamic Republic has been facing in recent years. However, Pezeshkian’s victory came as no surprise to many, primarily due to the unpopularity of his conservative opponent, Saeed Jalili. Pezeshkian also benefited from internal conflicts within the conservative front and the Guardian Council’s decision to allow a reformist candidate to participate in the elections. Yet, by advocating for a more moderate agenda, Pezeshkian garnered support from both the reformist electorate and minority groups. He advocated against state violence, championed social and economic reforms, and promoted dialogue with the West to address Iran’s domestic and international challenges. Indeed, Pezeshkian’s election may signal Iran’s readiness to return to diplomacy with the West, particularly the US. However, Iranian foreign policy remains under the control of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei’s leadership. Moreover, rapprochement is further complicated by the fact that the nuclear deal framework alone – the bottom-line for Iran to improve relations with the West – is no longer attractive to Iranians, who would like to prioritise the lifting of economic sanctions instead. Therefore, significant strategic changes are not expected from Pezeshkian’s election, and Tehran is likely to continue strengthening ties with BRICS+ and SCO countries, particularly Russia and China, and with the so-called “Axis of Resistance”.
Experts from the ISPI network discuss the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as the ninth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Low turnout signals a profound legitimacy crisis of the Iranian state
“Iran’s snap presidential election was both surprising and predictable. The big surprise was that after over a decade of sidelining the reformists, the regime hardliners finally approved a reformist candidate to run for president; Dr Masoud Pezeshkian, a former health minister in the administration of reformist President Mohammad Khatami, was approved by the Guardian Council much to the surprise of most Iranians, the reformist coalition, and even himself. But as past elections with reformist candidates have shown, and despite the record low turnout, he delivered a predictable victory by a strong margin. Turnout was low compared to previous presidential elections in Iran; widespread voter apathy, mistrust in every faction of the system – both reformists and hardliners – and an active boycott movement by activists, resulted in half of the eligible voters sitting the election out. A portrayal of the serious legitimacy crisis that the state has been dealing with for years.”
Negar Mortazavi, Editor & Host, Iran Podcast; Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy; Nonresident Scholar, Middle East Policy Council
Pezeshkian: an alternative to the unpopular Jalili
“Pezeshkian’s victory can be seen as a defeat for other candidates, especially the prominent representatives of the system. Unlike the technocrat Qalibaf and the hardliner Jalili, who both have a history of electoral losses and are widely unpopular, Pezeshkian is a relatively minor figure, unknown on the national stage. Like the 2005 election, where Ahmadinejad’s achieved victory over the well-known Rafsanjani, whose policies had alienated part of the population, voters were led to support the ‘other’ candidate. As such, Pezeshkian’s win represented an alternative to the unpopular Jalili. In the run-off round, Pezeshkian successfully mobilised part of the reformist electorate, obtaining 1 million more votes than in the first one. However, the turnout of 49.8% still indicates persistent widespread dissatisfaction in society and underscores the need for substantial reforms.”
Giorgia Perletta, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Università di Bologna; Adjunct Lecturer, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Pezeshkian is not an outsider
“Elections in Iran are far from democratic practices in western world. The criteria for being allowed to enter the race are unclear. The Guardian Council, the body that controls the processes, has become the extended arm of the Office of the Supreme Leader to ensure his views are directly considered in every election. Particularly in presidential election, where the elected individuals hold the second highest office after the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has been closely controlling the election by only allowing the Council to approve the most loyal elements of the establishment to enter the race. In such environment, it is obvious that President elect Pezeshkian is vetted by the system and personally trusted by Khamenei to assume the office. He is an insider, who pledges full allegiance to the Supreme Leader, and is devoted to work towards advancing the establishment’s two major goals: regime preservation and expansion of power globally. Therefore, to call him a ‘reformist’ or a ‘liberaliser’ (terms that have been used frequently in the western media to describe him) is rather naïve. He is a continuation of the system, who has neither desire nor power to shake and move the overall strategies of the system.”
Sara Bazoobandi, Associate Research Fellow, ISPI; Research Fellow, GIGA
In Iran, domestic improvements are closely tied to external affairs
“The latest presidential elections and the victory of reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian have injected some life into Iran’s otherwise quite depressing political context. While the divide between state and society remains deep with only 49.8% voter turnout, there is a glimpse of hope among the roughly 16 million voters of Pezeshkian, that their president-elect can pave the way for at least some gradual betterment in social, cultural, political and, most importantly, economic affairs. There is neither enthusiasm nor optimism among his voters. Many voted for him with a heavy heart. And yet, his comparably modest way of life, lack of any corruption scandal, as well as his explicit focus on social justice and anti-discrimination resonated well among an electorate that has endured manifold hardships. Pezeshkian is aware that domestic improvements are closely tied to external affairs. It is therefore fair to assume that Pezeshkian’s government will invest efforts into reducing tensions with the United States, as this would not only bring ease in the encompassing sanctions regime but also help Iran to advance its outreach and rapprochement with its immediate neighbours. The role of Europe in all of this will most likely be rather marginal.”
Adnan Tabatabai, CEO, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO)
Iran might now be ready to move toward diplomacy, but is the West ready?
“Pezeshkian promised to improve Iran’s economy by engaging directly with the United States to get sanctions lifted. However, while direct talks are necessary, they are not sufficient. The fundamental bargain at the heart of the JCPOA is no longer attractive to either side. The deal has to either be expanded to include non-nuclear issues as well as sustained lifting of primary American sanctions, or the two sides have to settle for a smaller arrangement that doesn’t resolve the nuclear issue but prevents the conflict from escalating. Pezeshkian’s election may signal that Iran is ready for such diplomacy. At a minimum, his election provides an opportunity that the West would be wise to explore. Whether there is such readiness in Washington, Paris and Berlin is a different matter.”
Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Pezeshkian’s election won’t weaken the “Axis of Resistance”
“In terms of Pezeshkian’s foreign policy, the following six considerations should be noted: 1. he is unlikely to radically change the strategic direction of Iranian foreign policy. 2. this strategy is developed by the Supreme Leader’s office (not the president). 3. the West – especially, the US – reneging on the nuclear deal has left a bitter taste in the mouths of all Iranian reformists. 4. under Pezeshkian, the relations with all the BRICS+, SCO, and ‘Axis of Resistance’ actors will be further strengthened while a serious attempt will be made to see if there is any appetite in the West to revive the JCPOA. 5. Iran’s geopolitics and geoeconomics is heavily reliant on the BRICS countries (including Russia and China), so there is no rationale (from the state’s perspective) for Iran to distance itself from these actors. And 6. Western countries are rather chaotically mired in internal disunity, the Ukraine war, Gaza war, and the policy of containing China. They are therefore unlikely to have enough focus to prioritise the revival of the JCPOA, which is the bottom-line for Iran to improve relations with the West.”
Mohammadbagher Forough, Assistant professor of Global History and International Relations, Erasmus University Rotterdam
L'articolo Will Iran’s Pezeshkian Reboot Dialogue with the West? proviene da ISPI.