The terrorist attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 have changed the regional and global dynamics. Both physical and cognitive elements of this crisis have been severe. Loss of life has prompted anger and resentment towards the state of Israel and its western allies across the region. In the battle of narratives, Iran and Iran-backed groups have been pushing to tilt the regional discourse in their own favour. Iran has remained a key player, through both its direct involvement in the conflict and its grey-zone aggression strategies. One year into the crisis, it is worth asking: ‘where Iran stands in October 2024?’
The first issue to explore is Iran’s regional posture. Iran’ regional strategy has brought it both gains and losses over the last year. Its support for the Yemeni Ansarullah (Houthis) has brought some successful results for Tehran in the physical battle. It has allowed Iran to test and showcase its warfare capabilities. The absence of a harsh response by the United States and its western allies to the destabilising acts of the Houthis highlighted the extent to which Iran-backed groups can be effective in threatening global security beyond Israel. In the war of narratives, Iran has supported efforts to cast the attacks by the Houthis (in the Red Sea and directly on Israel) as a freedom-fighting, justice-seeking response by the group to the war in Gaza. Iran has also launched two attacks on Israel, thus breaking the taboo of confronting Israel directly, something that no other state has done since Saddam Hussein in the 1990s.
Iran has faced some major setbacks too. An attack in Damascus in April 2024 that killed several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) senior commanders, a special operation to raid an Iranian weapons facility in the Masyaf area of Syria, the explosion of the pagers of Hezbollah members in Lebanon and the killing of Hezbollah senior leaders all demonstrated Israel’s military and intelligence supremacy.
Despite these setbacks, Tehran has remained determined to pursue its regional agenda over the past year. Through its support for regional groups, Iran has consistently sought to maintain its sub-threshold aggression, which it intends to be just enough to irritate Israel and its western allies and to consume their resources and capabilities, without triggering full-on war. This may have changed after Tehran decided to launch a barrage of missiles into Israel for the second time. This attack was much more substantial than the first, launched in April 2024. It prompted strong rhetoric from the Israeli government and its closest allies, particularly the United States
Saudi Arabia has never been so close to Iran
The second issue to examine is Iran’s relations with other Middle Eastern countries. The Chinese-brokered Iran-Saudi rapprochement that took place months before the start of the crisis, was indicative of the growing acceptance of Iran by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Member States.
After the drone and missile attacks on Saudi Aramco in 2019, and the military campaign in Yemen led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which did not lead to weakening of the Iran-backed Houthis, the GCC leaders seem to have decided to put aside their differences with Iran. This mostly stems from the general understanding amongst GCC governments that the United States is not willing to confront Iran on their behalf. Indeed, the US is still a major security provider to the GCC.
Nevertheless, the GCC no longer seems to be interested in the kind of transactional security relations that they have had with the US. Although, the US has remained their main security provider, the Member States have been actively seeking bilateral strategic cooperation with other global powers, including China, and are keen to link economic interests with security. The Iran-Saudi deal was a visible manifestation of such a strategy, where China, a major economic partner, also took on the role of strategic broker.
After Saudi Arabia, other countries, like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, have also indicated an inclination to reconcile with Iran. On his first state-visit to Iraq, President Pezeshkian talked about Iran’s support for a European-style model of border-free travel between Muslim countries, which remains remote from the current reality of the region. However, it signals Tehran’s confidence in the region’s acceptance of its position.
A global anti-US axis in the making
Lastly, Iran’s relations with international actors are worth exploring. For years, Iran has been seeking to strengthen its ties with Russia and China. In the last year, all three countries have aimed to signal a willingness to build a strategic alliance that would lead a global anti-US axis. They have been cooperating economically and sharing experience to advance that aim.
One major development in relation to Iran’s ties with these countries since October 2023 is their increasing military cooperation. For example, over the past decade, Iran has been expanding its maritime presence across the region. Its engagement in a joint naval drill with Russia and China has been a key step in showcasing its desire to build up its naval strength.
Iran’s first naval drill with Russia was in 2009 in the Caspian Sea. It was said to be focused on the environmental and maritime safety of the Caspian. Several joint naval exercises have been conducted in the Caspian since then, some of which included other littoral states. In recent years, the frequency and sophistication of such activities have increased. Since 2018, Iran, Russia and China have engaged in several joint naval drills, most of which started near the Gulf of Oman and started or ended in Chabahar Port. The latest of these was held in March 2024.
Arms transfers to Moscow by Tehran to assist Russia’s war effort in Ukraine are another clear example of such cooperation. Iran has managed to portray itself as a ‘partner’, in larger and more striking activities of the kind, with countries like Russia and China. Tehran’s objectives for engaging in such activities follow its broader strategic goals, namely to display power, to show off its ability to break its US-imposed isolation, and to pursue regional projects aimed at expanding its strategic depth.
All in all, Iran’s position across the region has been fluctuating. During the early months after the beginning of the crisis, Iran and Iran-backed groups visibly gained confidence in dictating the scope of crisis in Israel.
Since the beginning of the crisis in Lebanon, involving the destruction of Iran-backed Hezbollah’s senior ranks and military capabilities, Iran seems to have made major adjustments to its strategy. Hezbollah is a valuable asset for Tehran’s strategic project. The attacks on Hezbollah have undoubtedly influenced Tehran’s calculus. The Iranian government was under pressure to respond to those attacks to project an image of power in the eyes of its domestic and regional sympathetic constituents. In practice, however, this may end up being a bad bet for Iran. To enhance its strategic power, Tehran has adopted the new world order narrative of major global powers like Russia and China, and strengthened strategic ties with Moscow, while maintaining a relatively good understanding with former regional rivals like Saudi Arabia. That said, the second Iranian missile attack on Israel may tilt the balance of power further and to the detriment of the Iranian government.
L'articolo Despite the Death of Hezbollah Senior Leaders, Iran Maintains Its Regional Agenda proviene da ISPI.